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Contextualism in Epistemology 
ROBIN MCKENNA 
1. Contextualism in Context 
It is often said that ‘it depends on the context’. In its broadest sense, contextualism in 
epistemology is the view that epistemic matters - whether John knows, whether Sarah’s belief is 
justified - depend on the context. A diverse range of philosophers have defended contextualism in 
this broader sense: David Bloor (1991), Michel Foucault (1972), Thomas Kuhn (1970), Helen 
Longino (2002), Richard Rorty (1981), Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969), among others. This paper is 
concerned with contextualism in a narrower sense, which I’ll usually just refer to as 
‘contextualism’. Defenders of contextualism include Stewart Cohen (1988, 1999), Keith DeRose 
(1995, 2009), David Lewis (1979, 1996) and Gail Stine (1976). Roughly, it is the view that the 
truth-conditions of sentences of the form ‘S knows that p’ or ‘S is justified in believing p’ (where 
S is some subject and p some proposition) depend on features of the conversational context in 
which they are uttered, such as which error-possibilities are salient, or how much is at stake.1  
I have three aims. First, to explain what contextualism is (§1). Second, to outline the main 
arguments for contextualism (§2). Third, to outline the main objections (§3). I finish with avenues 
for future research (§4). In the rest of this section I discuss the broader relevance and origins of 
contextualism. We can start with three important features of the view. 
First, it is primarily concerned with knowledge (or justification) ascriptions, i.e. with utterances 
of sentences like ‘John knows that he has hands’.2 Thus, it contrasts with views primarily 
concerned with properties such as knowledge or justification (for instance, Annis 1978 and 
Williams 1991). For instance, Longino defends ‘critical contextual empiricism’, on which some 
content A which is accepted by a community C is knowledge for C just in case A accurately 
represents its intended object, is supported by the data available to C and has survived critical 
                                                 
 
1 While contextualists disagree about what the features are (see Blome-Tillmann 2014, Cohen 
1999, DeRose 2009, Ichikawa 2011, Lewis 1996, Neta 2002 and Schaffer 2004), I set these 
disputes aside here. 
2 Throughout I distinguish between uses and mentions of words like ‘knowledge’. When I am 
mentioning the word I put it in quotation marks. When I am using it I don’t. 
  
scrutiny from as many perspectives as are available in C (2002: 135-6). While Longino might be 
happy to add that this is also an account of the truth-conditions of sentences like ‘we know the 
universe is expanding’, the arguments she discusses are arguments for a thesis about the property 
knowledge, not the semantics of ‘knowledge’ (she appeals to the underdetermination of theory by 
evidence, not linguistic data). 
Second, it is a view on which the context that matters is the conversational context, not the 
social or historical context. For instance, Bloor (1991) argues that questions about rationality can 
only be meaningfully discussed within a social context. One motivation for broader forms of 
contextualism is the thought that norms of rationality are social and/or historical entities. The sort 
of contextualism considered here doesn’t speak to this motivation (but see Brister 2009, Fricker 
2008 and Henderson 2009). 
Third, it is a view on which the context that matters is the ascriber’s, not the subject of the 
ascription. Thus, it is not a view on which questions about epistemic evaluation must be settled by 
looking at the (social, historical) context of those whom we are evaluating. For instance, Rorty 
argued that an epistemic evaluation of Cardinal Bellarmine in his dispute with Galileo about the 
nature of the heavens must consider his social and historical context. When we do so we see that 
he was justified (1981: 328-31). Another motivation for broader forms of contextualism is the 
thought that epistemic evaluation of a subject must be based on the norms of rationality she 
accepts, not the norms we accept. Contextualism in our sense doesn’t speak to this motivation 
either. 
Contextualism is best understood against the backdrop of work by philosophers like David 
Lewis (1980) and David Kaplan (1989) on context-sensitivity in natural languages. It is a familiar 
point that the truth-conditions of sentences containing certain expressions, for instance indexicals 
like ‘I’, depend on the context. The contextualist proposes that the truth-conditions of sentences 
containing expressions like ‘know’ depend on the context too. An immediate question about this 
view is: why is it philosophically interesting? Contextualists like Cohen, DeRose, Lewis and Stine 
argued that sceptical arguments trade on ignoring the context-sensitivity of terms like ‘knows’. If 
they are right, the philosophical interest of contextualism is clear. With these remarks in place, I 
turn to my three aims. 
2. The View 
In this section I explain what contextualism is, and how it differs from strict invariantism, 
sensitive invariantism and relativism. 
  
We can work with a sort of contextualism on which the truth-conditions of knowledge 
ascriptions depend on the epistemic standard operative in the ascriber’s context (see Cohen 1999 
and DeRose 2009: Ch. 1).3 So, if Catriona says ‘Morven knows that the train stops in Graz’ the 
truth-conditions of her knowledge ascription depend on the epistemic standard operative in her 
context. I will answer three questions about this view:  
1. What does it mean to say that the truth-conditions of Catriona’s knowledge ascription depend on 
the epistemic standard operative in her context? 
2. Is the epistemic standard operative in her context just her standard, or some other standard? 
3. What are the alternatives to contextualism? 
Question One  
On a standard semantic framework, a sentence uttered in a context expresses a proposition that 
is evaluated for truth relative to the circumstance of evaluation of the context in which it was 
uttered (see Kaplan 1989). Some sentences express different propositions in different contexts of 
utterance. For instance, if Ruaraidh says ‘I am tired’ he expresses the proposition Ruaraidh is tired 
whereas if Catriona says ‘I am tired’ she expresses the proposition Catriona is tired.4  
Contextualists think that sentences like containing the expression ‘knows’ can express different 
propositions in different contexts of utterance.5 Catriona and Laurie are in separate contexts. Call 
the epistemic standard operative in Catriona’s context E1 and the epistemic standard operative in 
Laurie’s E2. If Catriona and Laurie both utter the sentence ‘Morven knows that the train stops in 
Graz’, the proposition expressed by Catriona’s ascription is something like Morven’s epistemic 
position with respect to p is strong enough to satisfy E1 whereas the proposition expressed by 
Laurie’s is something like Morven’s epistemic position with respect to p is strong enough to satisfy 
E2. Thus, their ascriptions express distinct propositions. It may be that what Catriona says is true 
yet what Laurie says is false, or vice versa.  
                                                 
 
3 Not all contextualists put things in terms of contextually shifting standards. Some talk about 
contextually shifting sets of alternatives (Blome-Tillmann 2014, Ichikawa 2011 and Lewis 1996). 
Others talk about contrast classes (Schaffer 2004) or evidence (Neta 2002). I set aside these 
intramural disputes here. 
4 I use italics for propositions throughout. 
5 And that they do so even if they contain no standard indexical expressions (‘I’ etc.). I ignore this 
qualification throughout. 
  
Question Two  
But what are these standards? Most contextualists think that the operative standard (or, set of 
relevant alternatives) need not be the ascriber’s standard (see DeRose 2009: Ch. 4, Blome-
Tillmann 2014: Ch. 1, Cohen 1999 and Ichikawa 2011). Following Lewis (1979), a context of 
utterance is a conversational situation in which speakers and their interlocutors make various 
conversational moves. The speakers in any conversation will have entered that conversation with 
the aim of distributing or receiving information, arguing their case, and so on. These aims underlie 
and explain the various conversational moves that the speakers make. At any point in the 
conversation, there will be certain things that the conversational participants all accept, whether 
because it’s obvious they all accept them, or because they have explicitly been accepted. Call the 
set of things the participants accept the ‘conversational score’. We can think of the epistemic 
standard operative in a conversation as a member of that set. Note that this standard need not be 
one that any participant accepts. The various participants might have been pushing for different 
standards, and the standard registered on the scoreboard is a compromise. 
Question Three  
There are three main competitors to contextualism: relativism, strict invariantism and sensitive 
invariantism. I introduce each in turn. 
If Catriona says ‘Morven knows that the train stops in Graz’ there are multiple contexts in which 
her knowledge ascription could be assessed. Ailsa can assess it from her context, using her 
standards, and I can assess it from my context, using my standards. Call these contexts ‘contexts 
of assessment’. MacFarlane (2014: Ch. 8) argues that Catriona expresses the proposition Morven 
knows that the train stops in Graz, and the truth-value of this proposition is relative to these various 
contexts of assessment. Thus, it may be true relative to Ailsa’s context of assessment, and false 
relative to mine (or vice versa). On this view a single proposition is true relative to some contexts 
of assessment yet false relative to others. I’ll call this view ‘relativism’ (see also Richard 2004).  
On the orthodox view of the semantics of knowledge ascriptions, utterances of sentences of the 
form ‘S knows that p’ express the same proposition in every context. Call this view ‘invariantism’. 
A further component of the orthodox view is that whether this proposition is true or false just 
depends on the sorts of things epistemologists have always talked about: evidence, the reliability 
of perceptual and other cognitive faculties, and the like. Call these things ‘truth-conducive’ factors 
(because they are relevant to whether our beliefs are true). Thus, whether a proposition like Morven 
knows that the train stops in Graz is true just depends on truth-conducive factors, and not at all on 
the context of utterance or assessment. I’ll call this ‘strict invariantism’ (see Brown 2006, Gerken 
2013, Nagel 2010, Reed 2010, Rysiew 2001 and Williamson 2000). 
  
Strict invariantism has two components. First, there’s the invariantist component: knowledge 
ascriptions express the same proposition in each context. Second, there’s the strict component: 
whether someone ‘knows’ just depends on truth-conducive factors. One could endorse the first 
component without endorsing the second. On this view, whether someone knows doesn’t shift with 
the context, but it does depend on a combination of truth and non-truth-conducive factors. I’ll call 
this view ‘sensitive invariantism’. The relevant non-truth-conducive factors are things like the 
subject’s practical situation (see Fantl and McGrath 2009 and Stanley 2005), or a combination of 
her practical situation and the sorts of error-possibilities she is considering (see Hawthorne 2004). 
Now that the main views are on the table, we can look at the arguments for contextualism.  
3. Arguments For  
Given the large body of literature, my aim here is modest. I will outline two arguments for 
contextualism, and summarise the main lines of criticism they have provoked. I start with context-
shifting arguments (CSAs for short) (§3.1). I then discuss the contextualist solution to the sceptical 
problem (§3.2). The general moral is that it isn’t clear whether the arguments for contextualism 
show it is preferable to alternative views.6 
3.1. CSAs 
Contextualists appeal to a putative general phenomenon: the appropriateness of ascribing 
‘knowledge’ depends on the context of ascription. This phenomenon is illustrated by cases like 
these: 
LOW: Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at 
the bank on the way home to deposit a check. It’s not important that they do so, as they have no 
impending bills. But, as they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long. 
Realising that it isn't very important that the check is deposited right away, Hannah says, ‘I know 
that the bank will be open tomorrow. I was there just two weeks ago on Saturday morning. So we 
can deposit our check tomorrow morning’. 
                                                 
 
6 I focus on these two arguments because they are the most prominent in the literature. For another 
sort of argument that appeals to the social roles of knowledge see Greco (2008), Henderson (2009) 
and Hannon (2013). For criticism of this argument see Gerken (2015) and Rysiew (2012). 
  
HIGH: Same setup, but here Hannah and Sarah have an impending bill and very little in their 
account, so it’s very important that they deposit their check by Saturday. Hannah notes that she 
was at the bank two weeks before on a Saturday morning, and it was open. But, as Sarah points 
out, banks do change their hours. Hannah says, ‘I guess you're right. I don't know that the bank 
will be open tomorrow’ (Stanley 2005: 3-4; for the original cases see DeRose 1992). 
How does the argument go? The starting point is that both Hannah’s knowledge ascription and 
her ‘knowledge’ denial are intuitively appropriate. A straightforward explanation of this would be 
that both her ascription and her denial are true. Because both would be true if the truth-conditions 
of knowledge ascriptions and denials depended on the context of utterance, contextualism provides 
a straightforward explanation (see Cohen 1999 and DeRose 2009: Ch. 2). 
This argument has been heavily criticised, but two sorts of criticism are worth highlighting. 
First, experimental epistemology can test whether folk judgements about these sorts of cases are 
sensitive to contextual factors. There are some studies indicating that folk judgements are sensitive 
to contextual factors (see DeRose 2011, Hansen and Chemla 2013, Pinillos 2012, Schaffer and 
Knobe 2012 and Sripada and Stanley 2012). But not all of these studies agree on the relevant 
factors. For instance, Sripada and Stanley’s study indicates that folk judgements are sensitive to 
practical factors, while Schaffer and Knobe’s indicates that they are sensitive to salience of error. 
Further, other studies indicate that there is no sensitivity to practical factors (see Buckwalter and 
Schaffer Forthcoming and Feltz and Zarpentine 2010), or no sensitivity to salience of error (see 
Buckwalter 2010). 
Second, defenders of alternative views can also explain the general phenomenon.7 For instance, 
following Grice (1989), we need to distinguish between a claim being appropriate and it being 
true. If I’m writing a job recommendation for a student, it may be true that she has good 
handwriting, but it wouldn’t be appropriate to say that she has good handwriting. Some strict 
invariantists have argued that, while it may be true that Sarah knows the bank is open, in HIGH it 
wouldn’t be appropriate to say that it is (see Brown 2006 and Rysiew 2001). Other strict 
invariantists have proposed psychological explanations of the general phenomenon. While the 
details are complicated, the rough idea is that judgements in cases like HIGH are caused by various 
psychological mechanisms and biases. Crucially, these mechanisms and biases are required to 
explain a wide range of phenomena, not just cases like HIGH (see Gerken 2013 and Nagel 2010).  
                                                 
 
7 I focus on strict invariantist explanations. For sensitive invariantist explanations see Hawthorne 
(2004: Ch. 4) and Stanley (2005: Ch. 5). For criticism of those explanations see DeRose (2009: 
Chs. 2-3, 7). For a relativist explanation see MacFarlane (2009: Ch. 8). 
  
While debate about CSAs has reached an advanced stage, it is unclear which view has come out 
on top. The experimental work canvassed above is inconclusive. While strict invariantists, 
sensitive invariantists and relativists have given accounts of our general phenomenon, those 
accounts face their own problems (for problems with contextualism see §4). The appeal to 
pragmatics has been extensively criticised (see Blome-Tillmann 2013, DeRose 2009: Ch. 3 and 
Dimmock and Huvenes 2014). The appeal to psychological mechanisms is a promising hypothesis, 
but more empirical work is required before we can conclude that these mechanisms actually cause 
our judgements (for further work see Alexander et. al. Forthcoming and Gerken and Beebe 
Forthcoming). If we want reason to accept or reject contextualism, we should look elsewhere. 
3.2. Scepticism 
Contextualists claim they can solve the sceptical problem (see Cohen 1988, DeRose 1995, Lewis 
1996 and Stine 1976). We can focus on this argument for scepticism: 
1. I don't know that I'm not a handless brain in a vat. 
2. If I don't know that I'm not a handless brain in a vat, then I don't know that I have hands. 
3. I don't know that I have hands.8 
This argument is valid and can be run for any proposition we ordinarily take ourselves to know 
which is such, if I were a handless brain in vat, it would be false. This covers most of our ordinary 
empirical knowledge. So, to avoid scepticism, we need to deny one of the premises. But the first 
premise looks plausible (if I were a handless brain in a vat, things would seem no different). And 
if I don’t know that I’m not a handless brain in a vat, how could I know that I have hands, given 
that it follows from my having hands that I’m not a handless brain in a vat?9 So the second premise 
looks plausible too. 
Because the argument is so compelling, we can impose two constraints on an acceptable 
response (see Cohen 1988). First, the response must explain why we found the argument 
compelling in the first place. If the argument involves an elementary error, why do we find it so 
compelling, even after reflection? Second, the response must explain why, even though it’s true 
                                                 
 
8 While contextualists focus on this argument (see DeRose 1995), there are other sceptical 
arguments. For discussion see Cohen (1998) and Pritchard (2005). 
9 The closure principle underlies this point. The principle says (roughly) that, if you know that p, 
and you know that p entails q and come to believe q on this basis, then you know that q. DeRose 
(1995) argues for this principle. Dretske (2005) and Nozick (1981) argue against. 
  
that I know that I have hands (and perhaps that I know that I’m not a handless brain in a vat), in 
certain contexts - in particular, the context of responding to the argument we’re considering - it’s 
inappropriate to just respond by saying ‘I know that I have hands’. 
The contextualist solution to scepticism is appealing because, prima facie, it gives us everything 
we want. The contextualist says that the second premise is true in all contexts. She also says that, 
in some contexts – contexts where sceptical hypotheses are up for discussion – the first premise is 
true. So, in those contexts, the conclusion is true. When the standards are high, I neither ‘know’ 
that I have hands nor that I’m not a handless brain in a vat. But, in other contexts – contexts where 
sceptical hypotheses are not up for discussion – the first premise is false. So, in those contexts, the 
conclusion does not follow. When the standards are low, I may well ‘know’ that I have hands, and 
that I’m not a handless brain in a vat. Where the sceptic goes wrong is in thinking that a conclusion 
she reaches in her sceptical context applies in non-sceptical contexts. This solution satisfies our 
two constraints. First, it is inappropriate to claim to ‘know’ that one has hands when responding 
to the sceptic because one’s claim is false. Second, it isn’t obvious that knowledge ascriptions are 
context-sensitive, which is why we find the sceptical argument compelling. 
This, I hope, goes some way to explaining why the contextualist solution to scepticism is 
attractive.  But there are problems. First, there is a range of viable anti-sceptical strategies in the 
literature (see, among others, Coliva 2010, Pritchard 2012 and Wright 2004). So why go 
contextualist? This point is bolstered by the next two problems. 
Second, many have worried that contextualism concedes too much to the sceptic (see Fogelin 
2000). This worry is especially pressing for Lewis’s (1996) version of contextualism, on which 
doing epistemology changes the context such that one no longer satisfies the contextual 
requirements for ‘knowing’. But the worry applies more generally. The sceptic is someone who, 
in her conversational moves, is pushing for standards such that ‘knowing” requires meeting 
exceptionally high standards. But does the sceptic inevitably succeed in pushing for these 
standards, as Lewis seems to have thought, or can other conversational participants resist? If the 
sceptic inevitably succeeds, the contextualist concedes far too much to the sceptic. As soon as she 
runs her sceptical argument, she triumphs. If the conversational participants can resist, then the 
simple contextualist response to the sceptical problem can’t be quite right. For one, in situations 
where one resists, any inappropriateness in claiming to ‘know’ can’t be because one doesn’t satisfy 
the contextual standards. For another, if the contextualist says resistance is always acceptable, it is 
unclear what remains of the contextualist response to scepticism. So we are owed an account of 
when resistance is acceptable, and when it isn’t. In short, the contextualist owes us a more 
complicated story (for a story see Blome-Tillmann 2014: Ch. 1). 
Finally, many have worried that contextualism is irrelevant to the sceptical problem (see 
Kornblith 2000). The contextualist says that, while we don’t ‘know’ according to the high 
  
standards operative in sceptical contexts, we do ‘know’ according to the lower standards operative 
in more standard contexts. But this doesn’t engage with the sort of radical sceptic who argues that 
we don’t ‘know’ according to any standards because, epistemically speaking, all beliefs, whether 
true or false, are on a par. To the extent that sceptical arguments (brains in vats, regress arguments, 
etc.) are intended to establish this conclusion, the problem with them has little to do with 
contextualism. 
4. Arguments Against 
In this section I’ll present three objections to contextualism. The first concerns the linguistic 
evidence for the context-sensitivity of the expression ‘knows’ (§4.1). The second concerns the way 
that the expression ‘knows’ behaves in certain contexts (§4.2). The third concerns the knowledge 
norm of assertion (§4.3). The general moral is that, while contextualism faces serious problems, 
contextualists have a range of plausible responses at their disposal. 
4.1. Linguistic Objections 
Some contextualists have proposed that ‘knows’ is analogous to gradable adjectives like ‘tall’ 
or ‘flat’ (see DeRose 1995 and Cohen 1999).10 A gradable adjective like ‘tall’ makes implicit 
reference to a contextually provided scale of height (see Kennedy 1999). Similarly, one might 
think that ‘knows’ makes implicit reference to a contextually provided epistemic standard, where 
we can think of particular epistemic standards as points on a scale, much as particular heights are 
points on a scale.  
However, Stanley (2005: Ch. 2) has argued that ‘knows’ isn’t gradable.11 First, unlike ‘knows’, 
gradable adjectives accept various degree modifiers (completely/very/quite) and comparative 
constructions. Consider: 
1. x is flatter than y  
2. x is completely/very/quite flat      
                                                 
 
10 Some, but not all. For instance, Lewis (1996) appeals to quantifiers. 
11 More precisely, ‘knows’ in the sense of ‘knows that’ isn’t gradable. In its other senses ‘knows’ 
is gradable (“S knows Tom better than R”, “S knows how to ride a bike better than R”, etc.) and 
accepts clarifying devices (“S knows Tom fairly well”, “S knows how to ride a bike fairly well”, 
etc.). 
  
3. *S completely/very much/quite knows that p12  
4. *S knows that p more than y 
Second, ‘knows’ doesn’t accept clarifying devices. Compare and contrast: 
5. x is roughly flat     
6. x is approximately flat 
7. *x roughly knows that p   
8. *x approximately knows that p 
Consequently, ‘knows’ isn’t analogous to gradable adjectives. 
While this objection only targets versions of contextualism that posit an analogy between 
‘knows’ and gradable adjectives, Stanley (2005: Ch. 3) provides other linguistic arguments against 
contextualism (fur further linguistic arguments see Kompa 2002, Hawthorne 2004: Ch. 2 and 
Richard 2004). For instance, he argues that this generalisation provides inductive reason to think 
that ‘knows’ isn’t context-sensitive: 
MULTIPLE OCCURRENCES: Since semantic context-sensitivity is traceable to an individual 
element (although that element may be unarticulated), multiple occurrences of that element in a 
discourse can mean different things. 
A wide range of context-sensitive expressions behave as the generalisation predicts: 
9. Every sailor waived to every sailor.  
10. That mouse is tall, but that elephant is not tall. 
11. That table is flat, and Holland is flat. 
12. This is heavier than this. 
Once any ambiguity is resolved, it’s easy to read (9)-(12) in such a way that the various context-
sensitive expressions (“every”, “tall”, “flat”, “this’) mean different things. But contrast (9)-(12) 
with (13)-(15): 
13. If they have hands, most non-epistemologists know that they have hands, but, even if they have 
hands, no epistemologist knows that she does. 
14. Morven knows that she has hands, but she doesn’t know that she’s not a handless brain in a vat. 
                                                 
 
12 I’ve used ‘*’ to indicate ungrammaticality. 
  
15. If the bank is open on Saturdays, I knew that the bank is open on Saturdays, but now that you 
mention the possibility that it has changed its opening hours, even if it is open on Saturdays I don’t 
know that it is. 
Even once any ambiguity is resolved, it’s not easy to read (13)-(15) in such a way that different 
occurrences of ‘knows’ mean different things. 
While these linguistic objections don’t prove that ‘knows’ isn’t context-sensitive, they put the 
burden of proof onto the contextualist. But contextualists have taken up this challenge and offered 
sophisticated responses to the linguistic objections (see Blome-Tillmann 2014: Ch. 4 and Schaffer 
and Szabo 2013). The debate is very much alive. 
4.2. Disagreement 
Many have argued that disagreement causes problems for contextualism (see MacFarlane 2014: 
Ch. 6, Richard 2004 and Williamson 2005). Consider these conversations:  
16. Ailsa: I know that the animal in the cage is a zebra. 
Laurie: No, you’re wrong. You don’t know that it’s a zebra because you can’t rule out the possibility 
that it’s a mule cleverly disguised to look like a zebra. 
17. Context 1 Niall and Cormac are at the zoo. 
Niall: Do you know what animal that is? 
Cormac: I know that it’s is a zebra. 
Context 2:  Niall is telling Laurie about his trip to the zoo. 
Laurie: What animals did you see? 
Niall: We saw a zebra. 
Laurie: How do you know that it was a zebra? 
Niall: Cormac told me it was because it had black and white stripes. 
Laurie: Cormac’s wrong, he doesn’t know that. How could he rule out the 
possibility that it was a mule cleverly disguised to look like a zebra?  
These conversations seem natural. But, by the contextualist’s lights, assuming Ailsa and Cormac 
meet the standards in their respective contexts, they weren’t wrong about anything. This makes it 
hard to explain Laurie’s and Cormac’s uses of the disagreement marker “you’re wrong”. So, 
though some aspects of our linguistic practice seem to support contextualism, other aspects cast 
doubt on it. 
  
While this objection casts doubt on contextualism, it is unclear what to take from it. Some argue 
that it gives us reason to adopt a sort of relativism (see MacFarlane 2014: Ch. 8 and Richard 2004). 
Others have argued that it gives us reason to adopt a sort of invariantism, whether strict or sensitive 
(see Williamson 2005). Contextualists have responded by positing extensive semantic blindness 
(see Cohen 1999 and DeRose 2009: Ch. 5). If competent speakers were sometimes blind to the 
context-sensitivity of knowledge ascriptions that would explain the disagreement data. But it does 
so by just denying its relevance to views about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. This makes 
one wonder what the principled difference between the disagreement data and the data provided 
by cases like LOW and HIGH is supposed to be. This worry has prompted some contextualists to 
take a different approach (see McKenna 2014; for a response to criticisms of contextualist appeals 
to semantic blindness see Montminy 2009). 
4.3. Assertion and Context 
Williamson (2000: Ch. 11) argues that knowledge is the norm of assertion. For our purposes we 
can phrase the knowledge norm of assertion as follows: 
ASSERTION: S is in a strong enough epistemic position to assert p iff S knows p. 
DeRose (2009: Ch. 3) appeals to the knowledge norm of assertion in arguing for contextualism. 
But Hawthorne (2004: Ch. 2) argues that ASSERTION causes problems for contextualism. To see 
the problem, we can start by noting that DeRose has to modify ASSERTION to make reference to 
contexts. DeRose suggests this modification: 
ASSERTION*: S is in a strong enough epistemic position to assert p iff ‘S knows p’ is true in S’s 
context (2009: 99). 
Imagine Sarah is deciding whether to go into the bank to cash her check now or come back 
tomorrow (Saturday). There’s no rush to cash the check, and Sarah has good evidence that the 
bank is open tomorrow (she remembers it being open on previous Saturdays). Sarah decides to 
come back tomorrow. Hannah is making the same decision. While Hannah has the same evidence 
as Sarah, it is imperative that Hannah cashes her check before Monday. Hannah goes in to cash 
her check. According to the contextualist, Sarah can truly say that both of them ‘know’, whereas 
Hannah can truly say that neither of them ‘know’. But, according to ASSERTION*, Sarah is in a 
strong enough epistemic position to assert, whereas Hannah isn’t. So the following are true: 
  
18. Hannah: Sarah doesn't know that the bank is open, but she’s in a strong enough epistemic position 
to assert that the bank is open. 
19. Sarah: Hannah knows that the bank is open, but she isn't in a strong enough epistemic position to 
assert that the bank is open. 
There are two problems here. First, (19)-(20) sound a little odd. A common contextualist 
rejoinder is that they only sound odd because we are sometimes blind to the context-sensitivity of 
‘knows’ (see Blome-Tillmann 2013 and DeRose 2009: Ch. 7). Second, ASSERTION* sits uneasily 
with one of the underlying ideas behind ASSERTION, which is that there is a single epistemic status 
– knowledge – which plays the central normative role in epistemology. If the contextualist is right, 
there are as many ‘knowledge statuses’ as there are contexts of utterance. Whether contextualism 
can be reconciled with the normative role of knowledge is an open question. 
5. The Future? 
While contextualism has increased in sophistication over the last decade, the point of the view 
has perhaps become lost in the process. With this in mind, here are some avenues for research: 
1. Contextualists have focused on a narrow range of epistemic terms: ‘knowledge”, “justification” 
and “evidence”. What about terms like “rational”, or the (epistemic) “ought”? The orthodoxy in 
linguistics is that modals like “ought” are context-sensitive (see Kratzer 2012). Can contextualists 
make use of this? 
2. How does contextualism in our sense relate to broader forms of contextualism? Many have worried 
that broadly contextualist views collapse into relativism, or are somehow incompatible with 
‘mainstream’ epistemology. Many have worried that contextualism in our sense lacks 
epistemological interest (isn’t it ‘just an account of some linguistic data’?).  Bringing the views 
closer together might deal with both sets of worries. 
  
3. I have said that contextualists are primarily interested in ascriptions of ‘knowledge”, not in the 
property knowledge. But, unless semantics can float free from metaphysics, the two can’t be neatly 
separated. What does the contextualist say about the property knowledge?13 
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